Hong Kong, April 15 (HBTV): According to multiple sources and media reports, Chairman Xi Jinping has recently removed yet another prominent figure from the People's Liberation Army (PLA). This time, it is General He Weidong, the second of two vice-chairs of the all-powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) and the number two behind Xi in the world's largest military organisation.

There are six members in the CMC—or now five, if these reports are accurate. He is reportedly the first uniformed CMC vice-chair to be removed since 1967. His dismissal—likely due to corruption, though no official reason has been given—marks the most dramatic purge of the PLA since Xi came to power.

Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy and National Security at the US-based Center for China Analysis, said these developments suggest a ‘major trust and corruption problem within the PLA’. He added: ‘This is by far the largest shake-up of PLA leadership and state-owned enterprises involved in military procurement in recent memory. It suggests deep anxiety and dysfunction within the ranks of China's military, and a failure of trust between Xi and the military.’

Since Xi assumed leadership, at least 78 senior PLA officers—those of at least two-star rank—have been removed. This includes eight former or serving CMC members, showing how no position is immune from Xi’s sweeping anti-corruption campaign. The most senior figure to fall prior to He was Admiral Miao Hua, director of the Political Work Department, removed six months ago for ‘serious violations of discipline’, a common euphemism for corruption.

Miao and He share a longstanding relationship, having served together in the former 31st Group Army in Xiamen, Fujian—where Xi also built his early political career. He commanded army troops in the province while Xi served as deputy secretary and later governor. Morris explained that this made He and Miao both military comrades and trusted members of Xi's inner circle.

He and Xi reportedly became close allies in the late 1990s. Morris stated, ‘It is also believed that when Xi was party secretary of Zhejiang, He was stationed in Huzhou, and Xi reportedly visited He and his army corps more than a dozen times.’

By dismissing He, Xi may be admitting to an error in judgment. Morris noted: ‘He Weidong was a surprise pick as second vice-chairman of the CMC. General He has been a career army officer and has been on an accelerated promotion track since Xi came to power. While he has deep operational experience, he has never served on the CMC or in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).’

He joined the PLA in December 1972 and served as commander of ground forces in the Western Theater Command from May 2016, which includes the disputed border with India. In 2019, he was promoted to lead the Eastern Theater Command, the primary command responsible for operations concerning Taiwan and the East China Sea, remaining in that position until January 2022.

Morris observed: ‘First, given his background in the Eastern Theater Command, He likely was one of Xi’s most important advisors on a Taiwan contingency. One has to wonder what impact, if any, his removal will have on the PLA’s Taiwan planning.’

He added: ‘Second, Xi appears to be targeting the Fujian “clique”, with Miao Hua and He Weidong both having moved up the ranks in the 31st Group Army. There may indeed be a targeted purge taking place of PLA officers having overlapped with Xi in the 31st (now the 73rd) Group Army in Xiamen, Fujian, and possibly the Eastern Theater Command.’

Lieutenant General Tang Yong, who also served in the Eastern Theater Command, was removed last month. He was Deputy Secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission and had been appointed by He. The removals suggest a possible ‘He Weidong’ faction had been forming. He frequently used the phrase ‘CMC chairperson responsibility system’, highlighting Xi’s total control over the PLA.

Unlike former defence minister Li Shangfu, whose investigation was partially public, He’s disappearance has been shrouded in secrecy. He has not been seen since the CCP’s high-profile Two Sessions gathering in Beijing from 5-11 March. Reports of his disappearance began circulating days later, and he has missed key events a CMC vice-chair would typically attend, including the Politburo-level Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries on 8-9 April.

K. Tristan Tang of the US-based Jamestown Foundation noted: ‘He Weidong’s current situation remains unknown. However, the hypothesis that Xi Jinping lost trust in He and has placed him under investigation is plausible. It also fits with a broader but related phenomenon—Xi’s low level of confidence in his senior military officers.’

Xi’s purging of PLA leadership is driven by the PLA’s role as the armed wing of the CCP, tasked with guaranteeing party rule. With domestic pressures such as an economic slowdown and global uncertainty mounting, Xi is determined to ensure unwavering military loyalty. As he said last year, quoting Mao Zedong: ‘The barrels of guns must always be in the hands of those who are loyal and dependable to the party.’

It is ironic that so many top PLA figures are accused of corruption, while Xi himself is believed to control vast hidden wealth. A US intelligence report from March 2025 claims Xi holds USD 1 billion in assets through family members. It also estimates that 65 per cent of Chinese government officials receive unofficial income via bribery. Though Xi has prosecuted 5 million CCP officials, these revelations undermine his anti-graft campaign.

The report states: ‘Industry research provides evidence that, as of 2024, Xi’s family retains millions in business interests and financial investments.’ A Chinese Embassy official allegedly tried—unsuccessfully—to have the report suppressed.

The 2016 Panama Papers leak had similarly implicated top Chinese families. Notably, CCP officials are not required to publicly disclose their assets.

The US intelligence report, Wealth and Corrupt Activities of the Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, stated: ‘Corruption is an endemic feature of and challenge for China, enabled by a political system with power highly centralized in the hands of the CCP, a CCP-centric concept of the rule of law, a lack of independent checks on public officials, and limited transparency.’ While Xi’s campaign has failed to eliminate corruption, it has helped him consolidate power and eliminate rivals.

Other defence leaders recently ousted include two Chinese defence ministers—Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu—and the top two commanders of the PLA Rocket Force, which oversees China’s nuclear arsenal. Though there were rumours about current Defence Minister Dong Jun, he was recently seen meeting the chief of the Pakistan Air Force, suggesting he was cleared of wrongdoing.

Tang noted: ‘A loss of trust in He Weidong’s ability to manage the PLA generals is the primary reason Xi may have removed him. Under his management, the number of PLA generals being investigated or removed for disciplinary violations or otherwise breaking the law since the 20th Party Congress has been high. Many of the affected generals had been promoted during He’s tenure, raising concerns about the personnel management and promotion system he oversaw.’

Tang concluded: ‘He Weidong’s likely downfall poses a deeper personnel problem for Xi. Within the PLA, only Zhang Youxia shares He’s rank; Miao Hua is under investigation; and Zhang Shengmin does not hold a Central Committee position. No one else would likely have the sufficient rank and experience to take on He’s role and manage PLA personnel effectively.’

Despite these internal purges, China continues to project military influence abroad. Ukraine has reportedly captured two Chinese nationals fighting for Russia, and estimates suggest about 155 Chinese men are participating in the war. While there is no confirmed evidence of state involvement, Russia is actively recruiting using Chinese-language promotional videos, offering USD 2,400 per month and a sign-up bonus.

US State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce said on April 8: ‘China is a major enabler of Russia in the war in Ukraine. China provides nearly 80 per cent of the dual-use items Russia needs to sustain the war. Eighty percent comes from China. As President Trump has said, continued cooperation between these two nuclear powers will only further contribute to global instability and make the United States and other countries less safe, less secure and less prosperous.’ 

(ANI)